What these assertions overlook, however, is that for the European states emerging from the shadow of the Soviet monolith, there was a clear normative aspiration -a 'Return to Europe', the Europe from which, it was frequently asserted, these states had been forcibly separated for over four decades. 3 The new CEE governments from the beginning framed their endeavours and aspirations with explicit reference to the core values of the European integration project. 4 They sought freedom, prosperity, and a secure place in the international community of nations, and especially within European organisations. In recent years similar sentiments have been increasingly expressed in the post-conflict western Balkans (even in the more fragile political climate of recent months) as elite and popular opinion has converged around the necessity of becoming part of the European 'club'. The European Union has been embraced on a voluntary basis as the material and normative structure to which aspiring states wish to attach themselves.
The 'enlargement as empire' thesis also mistakenly frames the enlargement process as an entirely asymmetrical negotiation, where the EU continually makes demands and candidate states habitually acquiesce with EU views. The 90,000 odd pages of legal approximation measures contained in the acquis communautaire must be transposed into domestic legislation and thereafter implemented accordingly. There is a wealth of evidence from the eastern enlargement round, however, of a negotiating climate which allowed for significant variance in the compliance regime, one where candidate The political landscape has been transformed along recognisable contours with regular free and fair elections for all levels of political office, functioning systems of public administration, substantive oversight of policy-making by elected representatives, a pluralist and free press and a vibrant civil society. If the 'enlargement as empire' thesis is to hold up then we should expect to find the degraded culture of public office which one finds in the western Balkans, continued nationalist dominance of political discourse, overt clientelism, rampant corruption and administrative dysfunctionality as the hallmarks of political life in CEE. That this is not the case constitutes demonstrable evidence of how unique and challenging is the situation in the western Balkans today.
Earlier Entrants
Another strand of the contemporary 'enlargement as empire' thesis is the comparative one in respect of the membership criteria which the EU places before aspiring member states. The main contention here is that previous entrants merely had to meet the very basic criterion of holding free and fair elections for political office and this 
EU Officialdom as 'overlords' on Enlargement Policy?
Advocates of the 'enlargement as empire' thesis reproduce one of the most popular images of the European Union when asserting that the accession process effectively transfers large areas of policy-making "into the hands of EU officialdom as strict measures are laid down adopting the EU acquis covering 29 chapters of the acquis amounting to almost 90,000 pages of EU regulations". 11 This is Brussels as an overweening, power-hungry ogre, the famed Brussels bureaucracy pushing the boundaries of its own power ever outwards. Such a view gives the impression that the enlargement process is completely dominated by unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats who push aside the member states and their representatives during the course of accession negotiations and impose their own neo-colonial imprint on the process and on the candidate states as they push for more and more 'reform' of But the Commission's role has been and continues to be balanced by those of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Because the Council sits at the apex of the EU decision-making system and all enlargement decisions are subject to the unanimity rule, the member states hold the whip hand, as in all other areas of foreign policy, and can (and frequently do) threaten to veto a policy move if they find it unsatisfactory or distasteful. 13 Once negotiations with applicant states conclude it is the Council which takes the decision (by unanimity) to accept or reject them.
Ultimately, therefore, the important decisions with regard to western Balkan accessions will be made by the member states of the EU collectively with the formal assent of the European Parliament also now being necessary. Thus any substantive examination of the division of labour on enlargement reveals a much more complex institutional structure than the simplistic 'EU Officialdom' would suggest.
States Without Sovereignty?
13 Cyprus and Greece have both threatened to put an end to Turkish accession negotiations on various occasions over the past four years. Austria threatened to veto the opening of negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 unless Croatia was also allowed to proceed to a fully fledged negotiation. instrumentalising local and national political actors with the result that organised crime has "seeped into every aspect of public life, bearing significant influence over political stability, rule of law, legality, and social and economic development (where does this quote end?). (it ends with economic development" ) 18 Weak states in combination with strong oligarchs and organised crime meant that the main prize of political competition in much of the western Balkans over the past two decades has been control over state-owned resources. 19 Giatzidis asserts that 'criminal organizations have risen to be the largest industry in the region and the single greatest threat to regional stability, in large part because these groups survival depends on crushing any efforts to introduce transparency, accountability and moderation in the political and economic systems of the state'. is that it is extremely difficult to disentangle the state from criminality. As Irrera argues in respect of Albania, which "illustrates a paradoxical case where the very individuals who seem to contributing to implementing institutional corruptionelected party leaders -are entrusted at the same time by the EU to return the country to the rule of law (where does this quote end?) (the quote ends with rule of law") . 21 .
The nexus between organised crime and politics is dangerously close and at the least an impediment to the achievement of both candidate state aspirations for membership and EU integration objectives.
This is not to argue that the EU strategy has not itself contributed to the problem in the region. One sustained criticism across the western Balkans has been the unrelenting focus on rule of law and governance issues at the expense of economic development and tackling underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty. This is a very valid criticism. In the case of Bosnia, Domm identifies a 'clash of agendas'
between an EU/Euro-Atlantic agenda focused on building defence capacity and the rule of law, and the agenda of domestic actors centred on employment and social protections. 22 In this sense EU policy seems to stand in opposition to the developmental trajectory of the original post-conflict European Economic Community which did so much to energise the integration process in the 1950s and 1960s and later through the Single Market Programme. 23 Another important criticism is that EU policy often plays into the hands of militant nationalist groupings, or at the least fails to marginalise them. As Rory Domm puts it: "strong-arm tactics required to push through reform risks grid-locking governing institutions and playing into the hands of The EU enlargement regime is a tried and tested one and constitutes the most successful instrument in the EU's external relations toolkit. But it is now facing a challenge in the western Balkans which is manifestly more difficult than anything 24 Ibid., p.167. 25 Ibid., p.162. encountered in previous accession contexts. In particular, the problem of first order democratisation, extending to the practice of statebuilding, remains cogent and, in the fallout from the Kosovan declaration all the more important in regional terms.
Overlaying a post-conflict transformation environment, EU policy has been as much a question of relating to and engaging with democratic transition as democratic consolidation. 26 The problem of inadequate state capacity is compounded by the relationship between state power and organised crime. As Gatzidis argues: "We are no longer facing societies penetrated by hosting the parasitical 'black economy': we are facing societies dominated by it in every aspect. We are facing entities that, by virtue of this pervasive system, are financially and otherwise more powerful than nation states in the region". 
